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Serbian villages have remained beyond broader anthropological interests in the second half of the 20th century. 
During the 1960s and at the beginning of 
the 1970s, there was partially increased in-
terest of foreign anthropologists in this re-
gion. A few social anthropologists - mostly 
from the United States of America - Joel M. 
Halpern, Eugene A. Hammel and Chris-
topher C. Ga!ney conducted a "eldwork 
research in Yugoslavia and among other 
fellow countries in Serbia. Halpern (1963, 
1972) mostly published articles on peas-
antry and a monograph about a Serbian vil-
lage in Šumadija (central Serbia). Ga!ney 
(1979) published an article on a former Ger-
man village in the Bačka region (Vojvodina 
province). Hammel (1969 a, b, c,) wrote sev-
eral articles on kinship and traditional fam-
ily relationships in urban and rural areas. 
A%er this period, almost total anthropolog-
ical silence had arisen which lasted until the 
1990s when Serbia again became the “top-
ic” due to the civil war and dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. However, the village remained 
neglected because of the primacy of studies 
of nationalism and the investigation of the 
social and political consequences of the war. 
However, as Dorondel and Şerban no-
tice in the introduction to this volume, the 
general problem not only with Serbian, but 
also with South-Eastern European peasant-
ry, is that its social and political history is 
widely neglected by peasant studies, despite 
the fact that it still does make a signi"cant 
percentage of population in these countries. 
Even the attempts of the communist regime’ 
to modernize the countryside in this area, 
mainly through collectivization, expropria-
tion and forced industrialization, have not 
lead to the disappearance of the peasantry 
from any of these countries’ (Dorondel and 
Şerban, 3). Many factors might be in play: 
economic – permanent national or recent 
global economic crises which were induced 
by unstable and corrupt governments; po-
litical factors – wars, civil rebellions, au-
thoritarian governments; institutional ones 
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– underdeveloped institutions of democra-
cy and the rule of the law. Yet all of them did 
have tremendous impact on current demo-
graphic trends in rural areas (see Bryceson 
et al. 2000; Spoor 2012; 2009, 26-28).
In Serbia, for instance, rural dwellers 
make 43,6%, while in Vojvodina province - 
which will be of special concern here - they 
make 43,33% of the overall population (RS 
Ministarstvo poljoprivrede 2009, 8). 'is pa-
per, therefore, represents an attempt to gain 
a closer insight into the current state of the 
Serbian countryside and its population, and 
to emphasize the main trajectories of the lat-
est rural transformation and development.     
'e paper has two tasks. 'e "rst is to 
highlight and summarize the main aspects 
of agrarian reforms in 20th century-Serbia, 
since there are limited national and interna-
tional anthropological sources on this top-
ic. 'e second task is to present the general 
transformation of Serbian agriculture a%er 
2000. Within the second task, special atten-
tion will be devoted to problematizing the 
imperatives of progress and modernization 
that have been imposed by state agricultural 
politics and strategy a%er 2000. 
'e main argument of this paper is fairly 
simple. Due to the lack of political and eco-
nomic continuity since the "rst agrarian 
reform in 1919, Serbian agricultural devel-
opment has been "rst and foremost a po-
litical (ideological) project than the aim in 
and of itself. Due to this fact, agricultural 
producers1 mostly su!er from professional 
and identity disorientation, which has been 
blatantly obvious since 2000. I argue that 
this has had an e!ect on the perception of 
semi-independency among village popu-
lations. More importantly, this has in(u-
enced the emergence of paired paradoxical 
and very complex relationships between the 
state and agricultural producers. 'e "rst 
represents the relationship between the ‘pa-
tronising’ state and the ‘demanding’ agri-
cultural producers. 'e second presents the 
relationship of the ‘neglectful’ state and the 
‘uncontrolled’ agricultural producers.       
'e "rst section of the paper is devoted 
to the historical overview of the main as-
pects of the agrarian reforms conducted 
in the 20th century. 'e second section 
presents an introduction into local setting 
of Gaj village in the South-Eastern Banat 
region in Vojvodina province, where "eld-
work research has been conducted. 'e vil-
lage of Gaj is taken as an example of a rela-
tively prosperous Serbian village where all 
controversy of the latest agricultural trans-
formation is obvious and deeply rooted in 
society2. 'e "rst part of the third section 
is devoted to the theoretical overview of the 
notion of  “peasantry” from the perspective 
of the urban-rural continuum. 'is sheds 
light on the whole complexity of the notion 
of peasantry and its burden. Since one of 
the transition aims of Serbian society from 
2000 onwards was modernization and trans-
formation of peasants into farmers with the 
support of the state, this section in the sec-
ond part also discusses why the process itself 
is highly super"cial and contradictory. 'e 
last section tries to demonstrate how cooper-
ation, i.e. ‘partnership’, between agricultural 
producers and the state functions on a daily 
basis. A few clustered examples of everyday 
strategies of people from Gaj  aim to give 
more insight into the nature of this coopera-
tion, i.e. ‘partnership’, which is based - as I 
will argue further - on manipulative strate-
gies from both sides. 'ese examples are also 
chosen to bring closer the complex relation-
ship between the ‘patronising’ state and the 
‘demanding’ agricultural producers, and the 
‘neglectful’ state and the ‘uncontrolled’ agri-
cultural producers. Finally, the paper tries to 
contribute to a better understanding of very 
vague professional and identity designation 
of agricultural producers, bearing in mind 
their constant juggling with the state on one 
side, and their identity on the other.   
A look back: Agrarian reforms  
and Politics in 20th century-serbia  
'e agrarian question in the Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1941) 
Jovana Diković
1)  I am using 
agricultural producer 
as value-neutral 
term, and as a ‘third 
way’ between the 
terms “peasant” and 
“farmer”, which have 
strong symbolic 
connotations. 
2) This paper partly 
reflects the topic of 
my ongoing Ph.D. re-
search that analyses 
the impact of official 
agricultural policy 
on everyday life, as 
well as discrepan-
cies between the 
official policy of rural 
development and its 
actual accomplish-
ments since 2001. 
The fieldwork in Gaj 
lasted from February 
until September 
2013 and was based 
on extensive par-
ticipant observation 
and semi-structured 
interviews.
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and, later on, in Socialist Yugoslavia (1945-
1991), was one of the most important issues 
that was sometimes acquiring even ‘sacred’ 
character (Milošević 2008). As every re-
form, these were also ideologically-inspired 
and driven within two completely di!erent 
political contexts. 'e First Agrarian Re-
form was conducted in the interwar period 
from 1919 to 1941. 'e Second Agrarian Re-
form was conducted from 1945 to 1953, but 
it was o)cially in force until the adoption 
of the 1991 Republic Law that marked the 
end of existing regulation in agriculture im-
posed by the state, and enforced restitution 
of agricultural land.       
'e First Agrarian Reform aimed to 
solve the problem of landless people who 
made 38,8% of the overall population in Vo-
jvodina province in 1910, as well as to ter-
minate outdated and backward ownership 
and property relations in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Dalmatia and in Southern Serbia 
(Kosovo and part of Macedonia) that be-
longed to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes (Erić 1958). Since the majority 
of big landholders not only in Vojvodina, 
but also in Bosnia and Hercegovina and 
South Serbia were of non-Slav origin, one 
of the reform goals was ‘Slav-ization’ of the 
territories by internal colonisation of people 
from the Kingdom (Gaćeša 1995).
Within the First Agrarian Reform, the 
state determined the agrarian maximum 
for the big estates depending on the type 
of land, region and average big estate in the 
respective region. 'e agrarian maximum 
ranged from 87 to 521 cadastral acres (Lekić 
2002, 104-117). All the land exceeding this 
particular maximum was allotted to the 
land fund, and the state had redeemed all 
land from its previous owners at market 
prices3. Peasants-bene"ciaries were paying 
temporary lease for the land they got until 
the "nal liquidation of the reform that last-
ed from 1931 to 1941 when it stopped due to 
the Second World War. In this second phase 
of the reform, known as liquidation, peas-
ant-bene"ciaries were supposed to redeem 
the land from the state and become its own-
ers. As for the bene"ciaries of the agrarian 
reform, the following categories had prior-
ity: war veterans and army volunteers, colo-
nists, landless people and poor domiciles. 
According to Gaćeša (1995), this reform 
undoubtedly had a civil character, particu-
larly because it eliminated remains of feu-
dal ownership structure on the one side, 
and, on the other side, it enabled continu-
ing capitalist production relationships in 
agriculture (238)4. 'is process changed the 
ownership structure in Vojvodina province, 
as well as in other parts of the Kingdom, 
except in Serbia and Montenegro, where 
free, private small and middle estates were 
dominant even before the reform. Due to 
the elimination of backward property rela-
tions, a signi"cant number of peasants had 
become landowners by 1941 (while many 
of them were only leaseholders at the be-
ginning of agrarian reform). Nevertheless, 
there were unsatis"ed parties, especially 
among ethnic minorities, war veterans and 
army volunteers, who did not receive any 
land, or compensation, even though they 
had priority over other parties. 'at was the 
result of un"nished and inconsequent con-
duction of agrarian reform and tremendous 
political in(uence on the process itself. 
Despite the fact that the rural popula-
tion made 84% of the Kingdom at that time, 
politicians from the biggest Radical and 
Democratic Parties, the latter being less 
in(uential than former one, did not see in 
it reform, but partisan capacity (Isić 1995, 
229-247). 'ey had dealt only nominally 
with the problems of the peasantry, until 
they won the elections. 'e Radical Party, 
for instance, did not have any integral party 
program on the social and political aspects 
of the peasantry and its development. On 
the other hand, Democrats were using the 
peasants’ voting capacity primarily to over-
throw the Radical Party (Isić 1995, 232). 
Overall, both the Radicals and Democrats 
supported the interests of the bourgeoisie in 
rural and urban areas rather than those of 
the mainstream peasantry. 
'e mainstream peasantry were faced 
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3) At the beginning 
of the agrar-
ian reform, the law 
from 1922 had 
anticipated that 
land would not be 
redeemed from the 
Habsburg dynasty, 
or from those who 
had gotten the 
estates as a reward 
from the Habsburg 
dynasty, or from the 
Turks and all others 
who had enlarged 
their estates due 
to the plunder or 
illegal conversion 
of the peasants’ 
land. But due to 
different political 
influences that came 
particularly from 
the biggest Radical 
Party, which was 
almost continuously 
in power between 
1919 and 1941, 
a large number of 
these big estates 
were redeemed by 
the state. That is how 
numerous previous 
owners became 
incredibly rich in a 
very short time (Lekic 
2002, 117-139).  
4)  Many contro-
versies surrounded 
the reform itself. To 
mention only a few: a 
selective conduction 
and interpretation of 
the law on Agrarian 
Reform by state bu-
reaucrats (Miloševic 
2008), and often 
political misuses and 
bribery which, as a 
goal, had to increase 
the maximum for 
certain big estates 
(Lekic 2002).
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with extremely low productivity due to 
outdated tools used in land cultivation, the 
lack of modern machinery and technology 
competences, education, health and other 
services, the lack of infrastructure and so 
on.  Because of this, a large number of peas-
ants were deep in bank debts and could not 
redeem the land they had obtained thanks 
to the agrarian reform. 'e interest of the 
peasants was advocated mostly by parties 
which were less in(uential. Interestingly, 
parties such as the Coalition of Agricultur-
al Workers, the Yugoslav Republican Party 
or the Peasant Party which were trying to 
penetrate the dominant political scene, 
were closer to the real needs of peasants and 
were more aware of what their reality really 
looked like (Isić 1995, 238). However, a%er 
the Second World War, peasants entered 
into new stage of their professional trans-
formation inspired by the communist vi-
sions of agriculture.  
'e Second Agrarian Reform began un-
der the slogan ‘'e land belongs to its cul-
tivators’.  'e targets of land expropriation 
became the large estates of banks, churches 
and monasteries, companies, as well as the 
big landlords’ estates that were spared, or 
partially embraced, by the First Agrarian 
Reform. 'e expropriated estates of previ-
ous owners were not compensated. One of 
the priorities of the new communist gov-
ernment was to establish state and collec-
tive agricultural cooperatives with compul-
sory membership by 1953 (Gaćeša 1984). 
Since cooperatives had very bad economic 
performance, poor work organisation, 
faced great resistance from the peasants 
and other side-problems such as massive 
the%s of cooperative goods and livestock, 
and misuse of position within the coopera-
tive hierarchy (Tošić 1959; Halpern 1963), 
the conclusion was that such state of a!airs 
was no longer sustainable. 'e Law on the 
Agrarian Land Fund of Common People’s 
Property (Zakon o poljoprivrednom fondu 
opštenarodne imovine) was passed in 1953. 
'e law represented a new stage of the col-
lectivization of property and the politics 
that further encouraged indirect subsidies 
to state farms, limitation of peasant hold-
ings and imposing high taxes on private 
farming (Halpern 1963, 162). 'is kind of 
agricultural regulation lasted until the 1991 
restitution of agricultural land.
 'e law introduced the agrarian maxi-
mum for private land up to 10 ha for agri-
cultural workers, and up to 5 ha for workers. 
All expropriated land was allotted to col-
lective cooperatives without any compen-
sation, while membership in cooperatives 
became voluntary. Alongside this change, 
the emergence and strengthening of ‘mixed’ 
worker-agricultural households (that were 
active partly in agriculture and partly in in-
dustry) had become prevalent.      
!e peasant-worker living on his holding 
and commuting to a job outside his village 
is an important component of the Yugoslav 
labour force. According to a special agri-
cultural census in 1960, it is estimated that 
there were some 1,306,000 peasant-workers 
in a total labour force of 2,985,000 (Halpern 
1972, 80). 
Until the restitution of agricultural land 
in 1991 – that has not yet been completed5, 
three forms of agricultural production or-
ganisation and ownership had dominated 
in Serbian villages: individual / private, 
state and collective.
A%er 1991, state strategies in agriculture 
were oriented primarily towards privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises and collec-
tive cooperatives, which would become an 
imperative of the new democratic govern-
ments in later years, i.e. a%er 2000. One of 
the goals of the Ministry of Agriculture since 
2001 has been the abolishment of ‘mixed’ 
worker-agricultural households, profession-
alization, privatization and modernization 
of agricultural sector. Such policies resulted 
in the increased number of registered agri-
cultural producers and changed ownership 
structure to some degree. According to the 
statistical data gathered in 2009, 67% of land 
was in private ownership, 30% in state own-
ership, 2% in collective, and other types of 
ownership made only 1% (RS Ministarstvo 
Jovana Diković
5) The 1991 
Republic Law 
acknowledged rights 
and restituted land 
to private claimants 
whose land passed 
into collective 
ownership according 
to the Law on the 
agricultural fund 
(1953), or by means 
of confiscation due 
to unfulfilled duties 
towards obliga-
tory redemption of 
agricultural goods 
from 1947 to 1953 
(„Sl. glasnik RS“ 
br.18/91). This 
meant taking away 
from collective 
ownership and 
giving land back to 
its former private 
owners regardless 
of their occupation 
(Curovic 1998, 3-8). 
The state had started 
to restitute only 
agricultural land, 
but the process was 
suspended in 1992 
due to financial 
sanctions against 
Serbia and Monte-
negro imposed by 
the United Nations. 
During this short pe-
riod, approximately 
150,000 ha were 
given back to the 
real owners, but the 
process has not yet 
been completed. 
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poljoprivrede 2009, 13). Nevertheless, the 
current state in agriculture is far from being 
an example of order and law. Nowadays, the 
agricultural sector binds di!erent political, 
private and state interests in common ma-
chinery to exploit resources, with informal 
practices and non-transparent contracts as 
an inevitable way of doing business, which, 
overall, represents a serious obstacle in fur-
thering agricultural progress.   
 
Local setting 
'e village of Gaj belongs to the Kovin mu-
nicipality and is located in the South Banat 
district, within the Vojvodina province. Gaj 
lies on (at and fertile soil with the Danube 
River (owing along the south edge of the 
village (about 7 km). Gaj is strategically very 
well located between four cities: Kovin, Bela 
Crkva, Smederevo and Pancevo. It is a highly 
multicultural community with Serbs form-
ing the majority, and Czechs, Romanians, 
Hungarians and Roma as minorities. With 
a population of almost 3.000, this village is 
among the most populated ones in the area.
'e village of Gaj experienced the same 
transformations as every other village in 
Serbia through the whole 20th century. In 
the eve of the "rst agrarian reform, the ca-
dastre area of Gaj had approximately 1230 
ha. Ploughs made approximately 454 ha, 
i.e. 36,6% of total surface (Pavković 2009, 
260). Even though there is no exact data on 
how much land was distributed to peasants, 
Pavković (2009) provides very insightful so-
cial background of the period from 1919 to 
1941 in Gaj. Apart from the lack of agricul-
tural machinery and advanced knowledge 
in cultivating the land, many people coped 
with very high state taxes and credit debts 
since they could not redeem the land they 
got. 'ere were cases when peasants were us-
ing bank credits aimed for land ransom for 
celebrations, weddings or building houses 
instead (Pavković 2009, 261-262). 'e vil-
lage also mirrored the micro-political scene 
of the state where representatives of Radical 
Party were the most in(uential and domi-
nant political factor on the local level, and, 
occasionally, these were representatives of 
the Democratic Party. Others, such as the 
representatives of the Social Democrats and 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia were signi"-
cantly less in(uential (Pavkovic 2009, 259).     
'e socialist period brought about, up 
to some extent, the diversi"ed professional 
orientation of the villagers. Apart from 
those who were mere agricultural produc-
ers, a part of the village population was em-
ployed in state companies and industries or 
the public sector, predominantly in Kovin 
and Smederevo, while Pancevo was a medi-
cal and educational centre. State vineyards 
nearby Bela Crkva were attractive for sea-
sonal workers and wage labourers. 
A%er the collapse of state agricultural 
cooperatives and forced collectivisation, the 
state began to found agricultural holdings in 
so-called collective ownership. 'is is how 
the Collective Agricultural Good 7th July 
was founded in 1955. 'is company pos-
sessed 1200 ha in collective ownership, out 
of which 2 / 3 of the land was expropriated 
land in the name of the agrarian maximum 
of 10 ha within the Second agrarian reform, 
and 1 / 3 consisted of village pastures con-
verted into ploughs (Pavkovic 2009, 293). 
'e company peaked at the beginning of 
the 1990s when around 150 people were em-
ployed – predominantly from Gaj. 
7th July became private in 1993 due to 
ownership transformation. Privatisation in 
Serbia from the beginning of the 1990s and 
particularly from 2000 onwards, resulted in 
massive shut downs of mentioned compa-
nies or their resale through auctions. Many 
people from Gaj lost their jobs during this 
time. 7th July, for instance, was bought by 
a local businessman, but, since 2010, it has 
been going through the insolvency process. 
Many believe the owner` s reason behind the 
purchase of the company was not its im-
provement, but rather a signi"cant amount 
of land which is in the company` s posses-
sion until the end of the restitution process.
On the other hand, the 1990s brought 
Neither Peasant, Nor Farmer. Transformations of Agriculture in Serbia after 2000
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about Kovin Mine, a new company, to Gaj. 
'e company was founded in 1995, only 7 km 
away from Gaj. 'e mine exploits lignite be-
neath the water surface, which is a rare min-
ing technique, as well as a distinctive feature 
of the village of Gaj. 'e mine has been oper-
ating pro"tably ever since and, even though it 
has undergone several changes in ownership, 
they have not a!ected its positive balance and 
success. Today, the mine, as well as very few 
successful companies in nearby cities, has cre-
ated a strong competitive atmosphere for ev-
ery potential job, but also the terrain for politi-
cal corruption and clientele relationships.   
A great part of the local population, 
whether unemployed, or employed in state 
or private companies, cultivates their pri-
vate or rented land. According to many in-
formants, even small pieces of land cannot 
be le% uncultivated. In the socialist period, 
those who belonged to mixed worker-agri-
cultural households would focus primarily 
on land and agriculture during the harvest 
season, and later on their second occupa-
tion (Pavkovic 2009, 340-377). One can 
suppose that the reason for this was the ad-
ditional income from the land, but also the 
strong social stigma in the local community 
related to uncultivated land6. 
'e average amount of cultivated land, 
whether private or rented, per household 
ranges between 5 ha and up to 20 ha, which 
usually depends on the number of people 
living in one household, age structure, and 
additional professional occupations of the 
family members. Among those who do not 
possess any land (or possess very little) are 
mainly professionals such as doctors, vets, 
lawyers, professors, teachers, and Roma in 
a large percentage. For 30% of inhabitants, 
agriculture is the only occupation, 10% are 
employed in construction and other indus-
tries, 6% are employed in the trade sector 
(predominantly private one), while 4.5% 
are employed in the public and state sector7. 
Besides these categories, pensioners and so-
called ‘gastarbeiter’ (people temporarily or 
permanently employed abroad) have an im-
portant impact on the local economy.  
For professional agricultural produc-
ers, meeting modern demands such as up-
to-date mechanisation and technological 
competences is inevitable. Competition rep-
resents one of their driving forces, but also 
one of their biggest worries. Strong compe-
tition over potential free land is increasing 
sale prices, but also the amount of annual 
land rent. According to many informants, 
at present, some 20 people from the village 
stand out from the others in the sense that 
they cultivate more than 100 ha. 'ey dictate 
the prices, but they o%en represent political 
factors in local council, or they are either 
leaders or members of local agricultural as-
sociations. 'e strongest agricultural pro-
ducers o%en support the ruling political par-
ty, whether on municipality or republic level. 
Isić (1995) emphasized one characteristic of 
Serbian peasantry from 1918 to 1925 which 
seems to be applicable to current agricultural 
producers. According to him, conservative in 
nature, the peasantry rather opted for parties 
in power, believing that this way they would 
be spared the arbitrariness and abuses of lo-
cal bureaucrats. Peasantry never opted for 
the party program, but rather for the author-
ity, personal connections and in(uences, as 
well for the economic power of the local and 
republic candidate, hoping to bene"t from it 
when the time came (Isić 1995, 240). Much 
of this presents the common way of under-
standing politics and the way things func-
tion towards the state and vice versa. 'e po-
litical clientele, therefore, seems an inevitable 
ingredient of success on the local level.       
'e close proximity of Gaj to several ur-
ban centres made the out(ow of people to be 
much less than in other parts of Serbia. Ex-
istence of private land plots, which enabled 
people to cultivate the land or to rent it out 
during socialism, was probably the deter-
minant factor in keeping people attached to 
the village despite their other professional 
occupations. Today, due to the generally un-
favourable economic conditions and high 
unemployment in the country (20,8%), agri-
culture and land might, at least, be additional 
sources of income, if not the main means of 
6) Only one of my 
informants resigned 
in the second half 
of the 1990s from 
a state company 
because he could 
not commit to 
agriculture, while 
many others have 
never considered 
leaving the job. Even 
today, many work 
additional jobs to 
agriculture, such as 
painting, repairing 
of car, agricultural 
machinery, electron-
ics etc. 
Jovana Diković
7) For more 
information on local 
population, see: 
http://www.selogaj.
rs/?page_id=103
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work. Apart from this, Gaj faces typical prob-
lems of Serbian villages such as high mor-
tality rate, aging, out(ow of youth, negative 
population growth and increasing number of 
single persons (man=402, women=253)8. 
'e locals’ everyday life is very much 
centred on 12 di!erent agricultural, cul-
tural, sport and artistic associations, which 
demonstrates their very developed sense of 
belonging, and awareness of political and 
social participation. 'e infrastructure is 
relatively solid due to the fact that it is one 
of the principal commitments of almost 
all representatives within the local council 
of Gaj. Very o%en it may be heard that Gaj 
represents an avant-garde village in com-
parison to other nearby villages due to its 
very developed political, social, cultural, 
economic activities and infrastructure. 
With all its facets, the village of Gaj is 
representative of the topic of this paper, that 
is, the transformation of agriculture a%er 
2000. Later in the text, special attention 
will be devoted to everyday strategies used 
by the people from Gaj who predominately 
work in agriculture. 'eir strategies point 
to their understanding and adaptation to 
transformations in agriculture and, partic-
ularly, to di!erent state politics. 
Lost in Modernization 
Many studies on peasantry have o%en 
emphasized general ideological or politi-
cal perceptions of peasants as backward, 
conservative, traditional, incapable of self-
organization and of focused political activ-
ity. 'e rural-urban dichotomies based on 
di!erences in quality and lifestyle between 
urban and rural areas, provisions of state, 
market and health services, infrastructure 
problems etc., made rural areas become sub-
ordinated to the urban centres (see Leonard 
and Kane! 2002; Ellis 1988). However, the 
notions of subordination and rural-urban 
dichotomy are the common tread in all 
classical theories of the peasantry, while 
‘peasantry itself is presented as the antonym 
of progress’ (Leonard and Kane! 2002, 7).  
In their study on rural sociology of ad-
vanced societies, Buttel and Newby (1980) 
summarize the theoretical problems the 
discipline has had since its beginnings. One 
theory from the 1930s that had dominated 
the discipline for many generations was on 
the rural-urban continuum and originally 
came from Sorokin and Zimmerman (1929). 
'is theory in(uenced the anthropological 
approach to peasantry (Red"eled 1947, Kroe-
ber 1948). 'e idea of the rural-urban con-
tinuum is based rather on generalizations on 
urban and rural societies that were inherited 
from classical political economic theories. It 
emphasizes speci"c characteristics of both 
societies such as occupational, cultural and 
social, which, overall, were not obstacles for 
their parallel survival and development. Such 
perceptions of peasantry were o%en benevo-
lent and sentimental and had nurtured an 
image of life which was lost in urban areas 
long time ago. 'e main problem with this 
approach was the recognition of the “specif-
ic” culture of peasant societies, that ‘they are a 
law unto themselves and cannot be account-
ed for, as are other social groups’, demanding, 
therefore, special sociology for rural people 
(Buttel and Newby 1980, 7). Nevertheless, the 
step forward was made when the limitations 
of the rural-urban continuum approach were 
revealed and when it was subjected to ques-
tioning (Lewis 1953).  
In the 1960s, the rural-urban continuum 
approach slowly lost its impact. More and 
more scholars began to problematize the 
conditioning of space with speci"c types 
of social, economic and cultural behav-
iour (Buttel and Newby 1980, 7-10). 'ey 
believed that ‘distinctive’ features of rural 
and urban society actually exist in both so-
cieties equally, meaning that space does not 
necessarily determine social, cultural and 
economic behaviour. ‘Any attempt to tie 
patterns of social relationships to speci"c 
geographical milieux is a singularly fruit-
less exercise’ (Buttel and Newby 1980, 8).  
Despite di!erent attempts in the aca-
demia to deconstruct the image of the peas-
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8) For more 
information on local 
population, see: 
http://www.selogaj.
rs/?page_id=103
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antry, the perception that there is an essen-
tial peasant nature, most likely because of 
the still very strong in(uence of socialist 
and classical economic political theories 
that have created such image (Leonard and 
Kane! 2002, 26), is generally still present.  
Peasants became part of communist ide-
ology in a very particular way. Since Marx-
ism was the "rst total ideology with de"nite 
vision of the world, the place of peasants 
was determined by their backwardness. 
Marxism and, later on communism, ad-
vocated the transition of peasants into in-
dustrial workers. 'e "nal result was sup-
posed to be the abolishment of their private 
property, intensi"ed state industrialization 
and collectivization of agricultural produc-
tion.  One of the aims was also to liberate 
peasants from their ‘chains’, i.e. land, sub-
sistence production and strong family and 
kinship relationships. Liberation also im-
plied increasing awareness of political ac-
tivism, participation and organization of 
peasants. On the other hand, classical eco-
nomics was very critical towards traditional 
reliance of peasants on subsistence produc-
tion and small and middle-sized land plots, 
believing that, under such conditions, pro"t 
maximization and achieving economy of 
scale is almost impossible.     
Even though there is causality up to some 
extent between space and social, cultural 
and economic behaviour, the main problem 
with the notion of peasantry today does not 
rely in its particularities based on the urban 
– rural dichotomy, but rather in the politici-
zation and instrumentalization of the notion 
of peasantry that is limited to several typi-
"ed or desirable images9. Bearing in mind 
the predominately negative association that 
comes along with the notion of peasantry, in 
the changed post-2000 political context, one 
of the aims of the o)cial Serbian agricultural 
agenda is to get rid of the category of peas-
ants in favour of rural modernisation and 
progress, embodied in the new term – farm-
ers. We will now see why this process was 
highly problematic for parties, the state and 
agricultural producers.   
***
Transition in many East European coun-
tries brought on new discourses on moder-
nity and progress based mainly on liberal 
democratic values and free market (see Hann 
1997; Leonard and Kane! 2002). 'e same 
occurred in Serbia. As mentioned before, 
some of the goals of the new democratic gov-
ernments and the Ministry of Agriculture 
were modernization of outdated concepts 
of ‘mixed’ worker-agriculture households, 
privatization of state enterprises and collec-
tive cooperatives, large investments into irri-
gation systems, rural infrastructure, updat-
ing agricultural mechanization by providing 
state-subsidized loans, and subsidizing ag-
ricultural production10. Even a slight look at 
di!erent development policies and Strategy 
for Agriculture Development (2014 - 2024) of 
the Ministry that have been published since 
2001, reveals they are very suggestive of the 
Ministry and the state as important actors 
who are going to ‘fund’, ‘help’, ‘stimulate’ 
or ‘subsidize’ di!erent agricultural sectors. 
Within these policies, the state is presented 
as a benevolent partner of the agricultural 
producers rather than as a tax collector, 
thus aiming to humanize the perception of 
the state. One of the obvious purposes was 
building the new image of the relationship 
between the state and agricultural producers 
that are no longer on opposite sides, as it was 
o%en the case in di!erent stages of socialism. 
'e term that describes the new level of 
cooperation is “partnership” between the 
state and agricultural producers. In the spirit 
of the new democratic politics, rhetoric and 
growing political correctness, the term peas-
ant was slowly replaced in public speeches 
and addressing by the new term farmer. 
'ere are several reasons for this. First, the 
term peasant has very strong negative con-
notations, as we have seen in the previous 
pages. Bearing in mind that “partnership” 
implies mutual equal respect and coopera-
tion between two parties, the term does not 
apply anymore, since it usually refers to the 
social and economic inferiority and subor-
dination. Secondly, the term peasant with 
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9) The image of 
peasants in Serbia is 
strongly embedded 
in both national 
history and politics. 
They had often been 
used in different 
political campaigns 
throughout the en-
tire 20th century (see 
Naumovic 1995). 
Nevertheless, on the 
global level, peas-
ants represented 
revolutionary and 
army forces, and, 
contrary to their sub-
ordination to urban 
centers, i.e. to the 
state, they were its 
main driving force. 
It is understand-
able, therefore, why 
different ideologies 
wanted to tie up the 
desirable image of 
the peasant to their 
vertical value. 
10) For more 
information, see: 
http://www.mpt.
gov.rs/articles/
list_titles/14/1/
agrarna-politika-
i-ruralni-razvoj.
html?menu_id=55
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all its connotations can hardly be associated 
with the modernisation discourse. 'e term 
farmer had become more suitable instead11.  
'e state, i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture, has 
taken over the role to intensify education and 
to organize courses, workshops, conferences 
and seminars aimed at improving knowl-
edge, skills and economic performance, and 
to assist the smooth transition of peasants 
towards professional farmers.  
On the other hand, agricultural produc-
ers have had representatives in the National 
Peasant Party in the parliament since 2012. 
'e party was founded in 1990 and, until 
2012, has had signi"cant ideological and 
inner-party transformations, from social 
democracy to far-right12. Agricultural pro-
ducers have been organizing themselves 
mainly since 2005 / 2006 within di!erent 
sorts of agricultural associations, and have 
participated to some degree in deliberating 
and dra%ing of agricultural laws.   
Looking from the outside, everything 
seems to be ideal. However, the main prob-
lem lies in the fact that the whole new agri-
cultural ambient seems transformed only on 
the surface. 'e real causes of such state are 
deeper and go back to the 1990s when the 
process of privatization started. 'e party 
in power (the Socialist Party of Serbia – SPS) 
at the time was building its own structure of 
interests, based on the “economy of favours”, 
both "nancial and logistical. Many of the 
former managers of successful socialist en-
terprises, politicians, parts of intelligence 
and criminal clans, joined in one common 
goal: to support the regime in power, i.e. the 
regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Ever since, 
cartelized economy has started to develop, 
while former socialist agricultural enterpris-
es, state and collective land, were among the 
"rst interest spheres where new business class 
of so-called tycoons started to dominate. 
'is state of a!airs has continued a%er dem-
ocratic changes in 2000, while these struc-
tures have become stronger, more complex 
and sometimes even absolute (cf. Ledeneva 
1999). Instead of the post-socialist “retreat” 
of the state, the process that emerged could 
be de"ned as “privatization of the state” or 
“emergence of the private state” (Hibou 
2004). Ruling elites, either state bureaucrats 
or political representatives, private actors, 
tycoons, foreign middlemen and other parts 
of the hierarchy of ‘private state’, actually use 
the space that used to belong to the state, (it is 
not anymore or it is a semi-state due to inef-
"cient law regulations or non-existing laws). 
'at is the space where the whole machinery 
of di!erent actors, based on non-transpar-
ent, semi-private or private contracts and fa-
vours, emerges. In one word, that is the space 
that is being privatized. 
'e agricultural producers feel their in-
terests are being neglected and subordinated 
to those of the ruling elites. A large number 
of informants and representatives of local 
agricultural associations from the village of 
Gaj usually complain about the low protec-
tion state provisions, the lawless state in the 
agricultural sector, the uncontrolled opera-
tion of tycoons regarding privatisation and 
lease of state land and so on. Interestingly, 
among agricultural producers themselves, 
there is one predominant belief that those 
who run agricultural associations want to 
become the part of the “system” and to pro"t 
from di!erent acquaintances by supporting 
the party in power. 'at is indicative of local 
or republic elections, particularly in the pe-
riod of campaigns. 'e last local elections in 
2013 in Kovin municipality were particularly 
important for agricultural associations, sim-
ply because they should have indicated and 
anticipated the results of republic elections. 
Judging according to campaigns, the local 
elections were taken very seriously. Many 
campaigns were not o%en in accordance with 
democratic standards. Bribing and electoral 
indoctrination of potential voters seemed 
to be most successful among Roma and ag-
ricultural producers13. 'eir voting capacity 
was very important, if not decisive, on the lo-
cal level because it might have contributed to 
the perpetuation of the “system” in the sense 
Ledeneva is using it (1999).             
Such a situation creates actual political 
isolation of one part of agricultural popula-
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11) The term 
“farmer” in the 
Serbian language 
has strong semantic 
connotations and is 
associated with big 
professionalized, 
private independent 
agricultural holdings 
like those that exist 
in the U.S.A. 
12) In 2012 this 
party was in coalition 
with the Serbian 
Progressive Party 
that won elections 
and formed the 
government.
13) Many informants 
said that campaign-
ers were bribing 
people in accordance 
with their social 
status. Roma and 
pensioners, for in-
stance, were getting 
packages containing 
meat, sugar, oil and 
other food supplies, 
or they got free 
ophthalmological 
and cardio check-
ups. Indoctrination 
of agricultural 
producers was more 
subtle. It was often 
accompanied with 
gifts in shape of a 
small bag consisting 
of a cup with the 
candidate`s face on 
it, his program and a 
pencil. Campaigners 
were secretly leaving 
those bags in front of 
the doors of agricul-
tural producers. 
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tion that does not have proper representa-
tives, neither within agricultural associa-
tions, nor within political parties. 'erefore, 
agricultural producers o%en feel they are le% 
on their own which, actually, fosters their 
perception of semi-independency on one 
side, and encourages them to rationalize 
some of their manipulative acts on the other, 
which will be later analysed in more detail. 
Further on, ambitiously-conceived agri-
cultural policies since 2001 were supposed 
to imply a high level of responsibility and 
professionalism on both sides, institutions 
and their representatives, and agricultural 
producers. But the current situation in the 
agricultural sector is very contradictory. 
'e most common example is the imposi-
tion of standards and new rules of doing 
business in agriculture without actual laws 
that would support and protect parties, in-
stitutions and agricultural producers.14 In 
an institutional sense, there is no predict-
ability which is conditio sine qua non for 
their successful functioning. 'at is how 
a paradox of empty modernization and 
progress emerges, where that which needs 
to be changed remains almost intact, while 
improvements are either individual (spon-
taneous or intended) achievements, or are 
side-results of a “system”-based machinery. 
In other words, those who are part of the 
“system” may enjoy the fruits of advocated 
modernization and progress.  
As a consequence, agricultural produc-
ers who remain outside the process do ben-
e"t from it in the sense that they do not have 
to perceive responsibility towards the state 
and its institutions as highly obligatory. 
In such moments, the old label of peasant 
has its applicable value. 'e label peasant, 
burdened with a lot of negative meaning, 
in semantic connotation does not comprise 
the idea of professionalism and business re-
sponsibility as the label farmer does. 'at is 
probably due to the decade-long neglect by 
the state, and, more importantly, their even 
longer status of “special”, “autonomous”, 
“conservative” and “traditional” parts of so-
ciety. Leonard and Kane! summarized the 
identity shi% in peasants in the sense that 
they have become ‘highly skilled in manip-
ulating the peasant label for their own pur-
poses. Rural inhabitants apply the term to 
themselves when it suits them and distance 
themselves from it when they feel it is not 
appropriate’ (Leonard and Kane! 2002, 34). 
Speci"c political, economic and identity 
adaptations to the current state are particu-
larly obvious in the agricultural producers’ 
daily routine and business. 'erefore, in the 
following pages, everyday strategies which 
re(ect the essence of above-described ten-
sions between agricultural producers and 
the state will be presented and analysed.   
the “Partnership”: 
the Upper Level of cooperation   
Taking the risk of expressing very strong 
statements, it seems that the “partnership” 
between the state and agricultural produc-
ers is very much based on manipulative 
strategies from both sides. On the part of 
the state, it is the matter of uncontrolled 
machinery of the “system” which cannot 
be turned o! easily, while on the side of 
agricultural producers, it is the matter of 
minimizing the risk and coping with un-
certainty. Here are presented a few of the 
most common examples of everyday ma-
nipulative strategies applied by agricultural 
producers from Gaj. 'ey are also chosen 
because they illustrate the weaknesses of 
the state in controlling and coping with the 
corruption and misuses of di!erent sorts. 
'ese examples, on the other hand, can be 
interpreted as agricultural producers’ ex-
pressions of resistance to the current state 
of agriculture, to the local and republic bu-
reaucrats and, more generally, to the “sys-
tem”. However, the main reason for their 
manipulative strategies is access to di!er-
ent resources (whether state or market), or 
maximization of existing resources. 
'e most common type of manipulative 
strategies among agricultural producers 
appears in the sphere of agricultural state-
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14) The most 
recent case is very 
illustrative. The state 
advocates different 
sorts of economic 
associations (and 
among others, 
agricultural), but the 
law on associations 
and cooperatives 
has not yet passed 
the parliament 
procedure because 
of re-drafting and 
editing since 2005. 
This law would 
define the terms, 
rights and obliga-
tions of parties that 
want to enter the 
association. 
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subsidies and market access. 'e subsidies 
are aimed at agricultural producers who 
cultivate between 0.5 ha and 99 ha. But, 
in reality, people who also use these sub-
sidies actually cultivate more than 100 ha. 
'ey usually transfer a half or more of their 
property to their family members, who are 
also registered as agricultural producers, or, 
only nominally, as a separate agricultural 
household at a di!erent address, but, actu-
ally, all family members within the same 
household bene"t from the subsidies. 
On the other hand, agricultural produc-
ers who cultivate a far less amount of land 
usually employ other strategies regarding 
the subsidies. At the end of a year, agri-
cultural producers o%en seek recourse for 
oil, fertilizers and seeds. 'e Ministry of 
Agriculture accepts only oil bills from one 
favoured oil company that is more expen-
sive than its competition. In such a context, 
people developed their own mechanisms for 
acquiring oil bills from that company and 
also “the black market of oil bills”, which 
functions according to the trade rules of de-
mand and supply. Moreover, they buy much 
cheaper smuggled oil for agricultural mech-
anisation on the black market.
In the context of access to the market, 
for ordinary agricultural producers, buying 
cheaper seeds and fertilizers, as well as sell-
ing their products directly on the market, i.e. 
beyond private agricultural cooperatives that 
are mediators between the producers and the 
market, is not possible. 'eoretically, they can 
sell their products directly to the stock mar-
ket, but they need to meet many demanding 
criteria such as large quantities, special con-
ditions for storing and keeping crops which 
almost no one can ful"l. Under such circum-
stances, many producers do not have any oth-
er option than to sell their products to a local 
cooperative for a lesser price than elsewhere. 
Because of this, many producers develop 
their own illegal channels of buyers to whom 
they sell their crops for a higher price. When 
they sell a signi"cant amount of crops, they 
do not make legal money transfers through 
their bank account in order to avoid enroll-
ing into the tax payment system. Instead, ag-
ricultural producers "nd a third con"dential 
person who appears as the nominal seller and 
whose bank account is used for the respective 
money transfer.   
However, the following example, even 
though not connected to manipulative 
strategies of agricultural producers, actual-
ly summarizes the most common problem. 
'at is the issue of tycoons in almost all big-
ger villages of Vojvodina and their tremen-
dous in(uence on politics. 'is was one of 
the main reasons for the foundation of the 
Association of Agricultural Producers from 
Gaj. 'e triggering event was when the own-
er of the agricultural company 7th July got 
the state land on lease from Kovin (approxi-
mately 1600 ha), that belonged to the village 
cadastral unit, without any public tenders 
and competition. Moreover, the monthly 
rent for the state land was far less than the 
commercial price. 'e agricultural produc-
ers within this Association organised them-
selves and protested against this decision in 
front of the city hall in Kovin in 2012. 'ey 
informed the Ministry of Agriculture about 
this abuse, arranged media broadcasting 
and publicly and openly addressed the is-
sue. Likewise, apart from combating mo-
nopoly, the reason of the Association was to 
create more transparent access to state land 
in accordance with commercial conditions, 
as well as to enable dispersion of the market 
and political participation on the local level. 
Even though the epilogue of this action re-
mains to be seen, this Association tried to 
engage and to bring everyday problems in 
agriculture to a higher level. 
'is example and other examples of 
manipulative strategies of the agricultur-
al producers of Gaj, as it has already been 
indicated, rather depict coping with mar-
ket uncertainties and minimizing busi-
ness risks, than tendentious frauds. 'eir 
acts are based on the rational and dynamic 
planning of their lives in the long and short 
term, by using the means at hand in a so-
ciety which is unpredictable and burdened 
with serious economic and social problems. 
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According to Milles and Blossfeld, people 
living under conditions of uncertainty of-
ten use a dynamic, rational choice model in 
order to ‘"nd the best action that "ts their 
given beliefs and desires, to develop the 
most appropriate belief given the evidence 
at hand, and to collect the correct amount 
of evidence’ (Milles and Blossfeld 2005, 16). 
Applied to agricultural producers who 
use manipulative strategies, one common 
argument might explain their actions. Al-
most every day, they face unstable market 
conditions, high in(ation, strict regulations 
for access to the market, monopolization of 
prices and the market itself, frequent changes 
in agricultural policies, raising standards for 
doing business in agriculture o%en without 
proper laws, politicization of export-import 
products, favouritism of di!erent sorts and 
so on. In fact, agricultural producers com-
pensate for their professional dissatisfaction 
by manipulating subsidies, by operating in 
the black market; by keeping open all formal 
and informal means of access to di!erent 
resources and, "nally, by protesting. Inter-
estingly, many of the interviewed produc-
ers agreed that they do not need subsidies to 
improve their agricultural production, but 
only predictable market conditions, rules 
and prices. Nevertheless, subsidies actually 
substitute losses and uncertainties in their 
business, so all those who do not have the 
o)cial right to apply for subsidies by these 
means want to protect themselves and their 
investments in agriculture. On the other 
hand, agricultural producers who manipu-
late subsidies, or who, at the same time, deal 
with formal and informal markets, rational-
ize their strategies with believes that entire 
Serbian agriculture is “on their backs”, so 
the pressure is huge, in addition to the con-
siderable harvesting risks. Unlike other pro-
fessions, in a number of cases, they do not 
have any alternatives to agriculture, because 
they were educated and trained only for ag-
riculture. 'eir success or failure is directly 
linked to their means of production, i.e. the 
land, which, therefore, requires the calcula-
tion of risks much in advance.   
***    
It seems that the “partnership” between 
agricultural producers and the state is cur-
rently coloured by the latter’s distrust. 'is 
is particularly evident in the situation of the 
so-called ‘neglectful’ state”15 when the state 
does not have the institutional capacities to 
monitor, or to provide certain institutional 
and business ambient to agricultural pro-
ducers, while, on the other hand, this situa-
tion favours the ruling elites of the “system”. 
Consequently, such state of a!airs creates an 
environment for uncontrolled operations of 
agricultural producers who, by disobeying 
existing regulations, express their protest, 
resistance and professional dissatisfaction.  
'e other side of the “partnership” be-
tween the state and agricultural producers 
is also very contradictory in itself. Namely, 
they understand what the market is and 
how it functions, particularly on the basis of 
demand and supply. Since 2001, the state’s 
role in agriculture has been, apart from pro-
viding services ("nancial, infrastructure, 
institutional, educational), that of building 
the image of the trustworthy party agricul-
tural producers can rely on. In other words, 
to patronize agriculture. Even though one 
of adopted principles in o)cial agricultural 
agendas was, nominally, free market ex-
change, the reality has proven the contrary. 
Very soon it was clear that there was a mo-
nopolized market, with the high in(uence 
of politics on the exchange of goods, with 
favoured export and import companies. 
Realizing that there is no free competition, 
agricultural producers have demanded pro-
tection and guarantees in the sense that the 
state should provide "xed prices and regu-
lar purchase of their agricultural products. 
'is has created a paradox, because agricul-
tural producers act according to free market 
rules in informal spheres (illegal markets), 
while they demand more regulations in for-
mal economic sphere.  
'e “partnership” between the state 
and agricultural producers is, actually, the 
litmus paper of a dysfunctional system 
where agricultural policies serve only to 
15) Conditionally 
speaking, distinc-
tions between the 
“neglectful” state 
and the “uncon-
trolled” agricultural 
producers, and the 
“patronising” state 
and the “demand-
ing” agricultural 
producers, appeared 
as my personal 
conclusion from the 
fieldwork experience 
and as the gen-
eral impression from 
over 70 in-depth 
interviews. 
Jovana Diković
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meet the standards on the surface, while, 
in fact, promises of transformations and 
modernization have remained mostly in the 
sphere of political marketing. And, instead 
of integrating agricultural producers in the 
process, paradoxically, the process itself is 
moving away from them, as they do not 
have enough political power to in(uence 
the change.
conclusion
'roughout the entire 20th century, the 
agricultural sector in Serbia represented a 
political issue and an ideological project. In 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slo-
venes the "rst agrarian reform was aimed 
at enabling ownership of land for landless 
people and at strengthening capitalist pro-
duction relationships in agriculture. 'e 
second agrarian reform in socialist Yugo-
slavia was aimed at limiting private owner-
ship of land and at strengthening collective 
and state-controlled production relation-
ships in agriculture. Post-socialist agricul-
tural transformation a%er 2001 has brought 
ideas of professionalization of agricultural 
producers, elimination of state agricultural 
enterprises and collective cooperatives, free 
market economy based on free competition 
and, predominantly, on private ownership. 
In the later phase of agricultural transfor-
mation, one of the aims of development 
policies was creating an environment where 
the partnership between agricultural pro-
ducers and the state would be recognised 
as the common interest of both parties. 
Such cooperation was supposed to result in 
placing Serbia on the regional or even Eu-
ropean map of most competitive exporters 
of agricultural goods. 'e actual outcomes 
of this partnership turned out to be failed 
promises and hopes of the progress of Ser-
bian agriculture. Whether because of the 
weaknesses of the state in controlling power 
and dominance of the ruling elites and their 
interests, or the lack of institutional capaci-
ties, willingness and know-how blueprints, 
agricultural producers have not bene"ted 
signi"cantly from having the state as their 
partner, or from supposedly liberated eco-
nomic conditions.   
Serbian agriculture, under the domina-
tion of monopoles and cartelised economy, 
has not achieved its goal. It did not become 
one of the largest agricultural exporters in 
the region, or in the European Union. But 
more importantly, as an everlasting ideo-
logical project, even in the 21st century, ag-
ricultural producers still search for their own 
professional and social identity expression. 
So, for the time being, they are neither here, 
nor there, neither peasants, nor farmers.   
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